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1. Introduction and overview 
 
The Least Developed Countries are the poorest countries in the world. They are officially 
designated as “least developed” by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the basis 
of a number of agreed criteria. There are currently 48 such countries, with a combined 
population of 613.5 million. This amounts to 13.1% of the total population in all developing 
countries. Their average GDP per capita is 287 dollars, or less than a dollar a day (UNCTAD 
2000a). 
The LDCs’ share of world trade has declined from 0.8% in 1980 to less than 0.5% today 
(WTO 1997). They have also had much slower economic growth than other developing 
countries. The average growth in real GDP per capita in 1990-98 was 0.9% in the LDCs 
compared to 3.1% in all developing countries. Thus, the LDCs are lagging behind. Policies 
that prevent further marginalisation of these countries are therefore most welcome. 
Several initiatives have been taken in recent years in order to reduce trade barriers for exports 
from LDCs. Some of these initiatives can be traced back to the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore in 1996, where the WTO members agreed to a plan of action to favour LDCs, 
“…including provisions for taking positive measures, for example duty-free access on an 
autonomous basis”. The EU recently decided to grant free market access for all products 
except arms within 2009. Two other OECD countries, Norway and New Zealand, have also 
decided to grant duty-free and quota-free access to all LDCs. The General Director of the 
WTO and the Least Developed Countries themselves have proposed to bind all tariffs on their 
products at zero rates in the WTO. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic impact on the LDCs of different policies 
that reduce the trade barriers they face in their export markets. We concentrate on markets in 
the QUAD-countries (the EU, the USA, Canada, and Japan), which represent 65-75% of LDC 
exports. Potential benefits of duty-free and quota-free access to the QUAD include: (1) 
Higher prices on existing exports to the QUAD,1 (2) Price gains from diverting sales from 
other markets (other export markets or domestic markets) to the QUAD countries, (3) 
Increased value added through expansion of production. 
 
                                                 
1 As we discuss below, consumer welfare in the LDCs might also be affected by price changes. Consumer prices 
may rise or fall depending on domestic policies in the LDCs. 
 
 
3 
Our conclusion is that the aggregate benefits of duty-free and quota-free access for the LDCs 
are likely to be modest, even when measured relative to their present low levels of income. 
The main reasons are (1) that most LDCs presently enjoy quite liberal market access in 
important export markets, and (2) that the ability of LDCs to take advantage of trade 
preferences is limited, due to supply constraints and restrictive “rules of origin”. 
The benefits for LDCs of improved market access have also been estimated by Ianchovichina 
et al. (2000), Hoekman et al. (2001), and UNCTAD (2000b). Of these, only the first study use 
welfare as the measuring rod. Ianchovichina et al. (2000) find welfare increases that are larger 
than ours without changing the conclusion that the benefits are relatively modest. A major 
problem with this study is that it does not take into account existing preferential margins, 
implying that the welfare gains may be overestimated. Hoekman et al. (2001) and UNCTAD 
(2000b) measure increases in export revenues. Since part of the increase in export revenues 
comes from increased LDC production, these studies overestimate the change in welfare if 
increasing production is costly. In addition, they each in their own way exaggerate the 
possibilities for expanding exports. The UNCTAD study assumes that there are no supply 
constraints2; Hoekman et al. (2001) ignore the problems caused by restrictive rules of origin. 
On the other hand, none of these studies take into account the potential gains to LDCs from 
using import-export swaps, that is, satisfying domestic consumer demand through imports 
while exporting their own production in order to take advantage of the preferential margins in 
the QUAD. In this study, we show that import-export swaps may play a key role in 
determining the size of the gains.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we outline a theoretical 
approach to measuring the gains from increased market access on a preferential basis. Based 
on this approach, we provide some estimates of the benefits that LDCs might reap in section 
3. In section 4, we interpret the results, and qualify them through an assessment of various 
other types of barriers that might prevent these countries from capturing the potential gains 
from duty-free, quota-free access to the QUAD. Section 5, which concludes the paper, 
summarises our arguments and results.  
 
                                                 
2 Formally, LDC supply curves are assumed to be infinitely price elastic. 
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2. Gains from preferential market access – a theoretical approach 
We develop a static partial equilibrium model in order to assess the potential gains from 
preferential market access for the Least Developed Countries in the QUAD.  
 
Supply and demand 
In the LDCs, a representative consumer consumes and produces two goods, x and g.3 Only x 
is internationally traded. We use a quasi-linear utility function gxugxu += )(),( , implying 
that the demand for x is not affected by changes in income.4 Normalise the price of g  to one 
and let Lp  denote the consumer price of x in the LDCs. Furthermore, let )( Lpv  denote the 
indirect utility function, representing the maximal utility obtainable when the price is Lp . By 
Roy’s identity, the demand for x in the LDCs is defined by )(')( LL pvpd −≡ . 
Good x is produced by firms that maximise their profits taking prices as given. Let )( Lqπ  
denote the maximum profit for a representative LDCs producer as a function of the producer 
price Lq . By Hotelling’s lemma, the supply of x in the LDCs is defined by )(')( LL qqs π≡ . 
Good x is internationally traded. There are two trading regions in addition to the LDCs; the 
QUAD (Q) and the rest of the world (R). Let ),( iiii qpmm =  be the net import demand in 
region i ( RQLi ,,= ), defined as a function of the producer and consumer prices in the 
respective regions. im  may be either positive (for a net importer) or negative (for a net 
exporter).  
Let ijt  denote the import tariff levied by region i on their imports from region j. Preferential 
treatment of the LDCs in the QUAD implies that QRQL tt < . Without loss of generality, we 
assume that there are no tariffs in region R (i.e., 0=Rjt ). We also assume that the LDCs do 
not implement preferential tariff regimes (i.e., LLRLQ ttt ≡= ).      
The price level in rest of the world will henceforth be denoted p and will be referred to as the 
“world market price” of good x. In the QUAD, which is assumed to be a net importer of x, the 
                                                 
3 Hence, issues of income distribution are ignored. 
4 This is reasonable in a partial equilibrium model when the good that we study accounts for only a small 
fraction of total consumption. 
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price of x will exceed the world market price by the import tariff QRt . Hence, QRQ tpp += . 
Both in the QUAD and in the rest of the world producer prices equal consumer prices. The 
respective import demand functions can then be written as )( pmm RR =  and 
)( QRQQ tpmm += . 
In the LDCs, preferential treatment may create a wedge between producer prices and 
consumer prices. LDC exporters must choose between exporting to the rest of the world and 
receive the world market price p or export to the QUAD and receive the price QLQ tp − . In 
general, the producer price in the LDCs is given as ),max( QLQL tppq −= . Any trade 
preferences in the QUAD will make it profitable to export everything to that region: 
pttptp QLQRQLQ >−+=−  when QRQL tt < .
5 The producer price in the LDCs then exceeds 
the world market price by the preferential margin, i.e., QLQRL ttpq −+= . 
Any preferential trade agreement must includes some kind of “rules of origin” in order to 
prevent third countries from taking advantage of the preferential margin. Since there are rules 
of origin, in the LDCs it is possible to maintain a consumer price below the producer price. 
LDC consumers may import good x at the world market price p plus any import tariffs 
imposed by the LDC countries Lt . Alternatively, they may buy the good from domestic 
producers at price Lq . The consumer price in LDCs is then ),min( QLQRLL ttptpp −++= .  
Equilibrium 
Two different types of equilibria may arise: (1) When the LDC import tariff is larger than the 
preferential margin QLQRL ttt −> , LDC consumers will find domestically produced goods 
cheaper than imported goods. LDC production will then first satisfy domestic demand and 
any surplus will be exported to the QUAD. (2) When the LDC import tariff is smaller than the 
preferential margin QLQRL ttt −< , LDC consumers will find imported goods cheaper than 
domestically produced goods. The LDCs will then export all their production to the QUAD 
and import what they need for domestic consumption from the world market. This is known 
as an “import-export swap”. 
                                                 
5 We assume that the whole of the preferential margin can be captured by LDC producers. As discussed below, 
this might not be an accurate description of reality, but unfortunately not much is known about the market power 
of QUAD importers in the relevant markets. 
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In equilibrium, world net imports must be zero. The equilibrium conditions for the two 
different types of equilibria can be stated as follows: 
 
(I) Without import-export swap:  
0)()()()( =−+−−++++ QLQRQLQRRQRQ ttpsttpdpmtpm      
(II) With import-export swap: 
   0)()()()( =−+−++++ QLQRLRQRQ ttpstpdpmtpm  
 
These conditions define the world market price of good x as a function of trade policy 
parameters. For later reference, it will be useful to derive the effect on the world market price 
of preferential trade provisions towards LDCs in the QUAD. Implicit differentiation yields: 
 
(I): ( )1,0
''''
''
∈
−++
+−
−=
sdmm
sd
dt
dp
RQQL
      
(II): ( )1,0
''''
'
∈
−++
−=
sdmm
s
dt
dp
RQQL
 
 
where derivatives are denoted by primes (e.g. ( )
L
L
q
qss ∂
∂
=' ). The signs of the derivatives on 
the right-hand side of these expressions are the conventional ones. Hence, with demand 
falling and supply rising in consumer and producer prices, respectively, net import demand in 
the QUAD and the rest of the world are declining functions of the market prices in those 
locations. It follows that preferential treatment (a fall in QLt ) reduces the world market price 
of good x. Trade preferences causes a rise in the producer price in the LDCs (and in case 1 
also a rise in the consumer price). The effect is to increase net exports from the LDCs on the 
world market, which brings the world market price down.  
 
Welfare 
Welfare in the LDCs is the sum of utilities and profits.6 In addition, there may be government 
income from import tariffs. However, we shall assume that tariff revenues are zero in 
                                                 
6 We assume that firms are fully owned by LDC citizens. If some of the increase in profits accrues to foreigners, 
this will of course reduce the total welfare gains to the LDCs from preferential treatment. Unfortunately, there 
are no readily available measures of the extent to which this is the case. 
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equilibrium. The reason is the following: Assuming, as is reasonable, that LDC countries are 
price takers on the international import markets, an import tariff will be inefficient in our 
model. The reason why this policy instrument still is included in the model is that 
considerations about security of supply of certain essential goods (e.g., food) may lead LDCs 
to put up import controls in order to avoid extensive import-export swaps. In our model, this 
can be achieved by raising Lt  above the preferential margin. Domestic producers will then 
satisfy domestic demand before any surplus is exported. But in this case, as long as the LDCs 
are net exporters of the relevant good, the equilibrium tariff revenue will be zero. In other 
words, we contend that the tax revenue is zero either because Lt  is zero in order to achieve 
efficiency (in the model sense) or because the tariff is raised to a prohibitive level in order to 
discourage import-export swaps for some other reason. Welfare is then 
 
)()( LL qpvW π+= . 
 
We now want to investigate the welfare effect of preferential tariffs for the LDCs in the 
QUAD. For convenience of notation, we analyse the case where tariffs in LDC exports to the 
QUAD are completely removed, i.e., QLQL tt −=∆ . Let superscripts 0 and 1 refer to the initial 
and the new equilibrium, respectively. The welfare effect of the reform is then 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )001101 LLLL qpvqpvWWW ππ −−+=−=∆   
 
In order to simplify the analysis, we will assume that demand and supply functions in the 
LDC are linear (i.e., 0'''''' == πv ). By using a Taylor series expansion, the general expression 
for the welfare change can be approximated as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )200200
002000
2000
01
'
2
1'
2
1
''
2
1'    
''
2
1'
LLLLLLLL
LLLLLLL
LLLLL
qqsqqsppdppd
qpvqqqqq
ppvppvpv
WWW
∆+∆+∆−∆−=
−−∆+∆++
∆+∆+=
−=∆
ππππ
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where we have used the facts that dv −=' , ''' dv −= , s='π , and ''' s=π . Hence, the change in 
welfare can be measured with information on initial levels of production and consumption in 
LDCs, changes in consumer and producer prices, and the slopes of demand and supply 
functions.  
 
Welfare effect without import-export swaps 
Consider first the case where the import tariff in the LDCs is raised sufficiently to prevent 
import-export swaps. Then, LL qp =  and QLQLLL tptpqp +∆=∆−∆=∆=∆ . The welfare 
change is  
 
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )( )202000 '
2
1'
2
1
QLLQLLQLLLI tpqstppdtppdqsW +∆++∆−+∆−=∆    
 
The first term is the terms of trade effect, which is positive as long as the LDC is a net 
exporter. The first order effect of the removal of tariffs is to improve terms of trade by QLt . 
However, in equilibrium some of this gain is lost through the fall in the world market price of 
x ( 0<∆p ). Still, from the results derived above we know that 0>∆ Lq  since the fall in the 
world market price is only a fraction of the decline in the tariff. The second term refers to the 
gain from replacing domestic consumption with exports as the export price rises; with a 
higher export price, the marginal willingness to pay in the LDCs will fall short of the price 
that can be obtained on the international market. Hence, a gain can be reaped by reducing 
domestic consumption somewhat and export these units instead. The third term refers to 
increased value added through higher production. A higher producer price stimulates LDC 
production, and the increase in the value added is part of the gain from preferential market 
access. 
These welfare effects are illustrated in figure 1. The figure shows demand and supply 
functions in the LDCs and decomposes the welfare effect of given free market access to 
products from the LDCs on a preferential basis. The initial equilibrium price is 0p . The 
granting of trade preferences to LDCs reduces the world market price to 1p  and increases the 
LDC producer price to 1Lq . The consumer price in the LDCs is equal to 
1
Lq  when an import 
tariff is used in the LDCs in order to prevent import-export swaps and 1p  if import-export 
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swaps are allowed and the import tariff is set to zero. 
The terms of trade effect corresponds to the area C in the figure. The “export for 
consumption”-effect is represented by B, while the value added from increased production is 
reflected by area D. The total gain for the LDCs without import-export swaps is thus the area 
B+C+D. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare effect with import-export swaps 
Consider next the case where the LDC keeps its import tariff at zero, implying that 
preferential access will induce an import-export swap. Then, ppL = , ppL ∆=∆  and 
QLL tpq +∆=∆ . The welfare change is  
 
0s
1
Lq
B
0d
D
I
H
1p
000
LL qpp ==
Price 
Quantity 
F 
Supply, s(qL) 
C
G 
Demand, d(pL) 
E
Preferential margin (tQR) 
J
A
Figure 1. LDC gains and losses  
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )200200 '
2
1'
2
1
QLLQLLLLII tpqstpqsppdppdW +∆++∆+∆−∆−=∆  
 
The two first terms represent the gain in consumer surplus as the world market price of 
imported goods decreases (areas E and F in figure 1). The third term is the gain from higher 
prices on existing exports (the area A+B+C), and the latter term is the increased value added 
in production as the higher producer price induces a higher level of production (area D). The 
total welfare gain when import and export swaps are used is thus A+B+C+D+E+F, which 
exceeds the gain without swaps by A+E+F. The higher level of welfare is wholly due to the 
fact that LDC consumers in this case are allowed to benefit from the new, lower world market 
price of x.  
Full utilisation of import-export swaps is probably not realistic in practice, for two reasons. 
First of all, LDC governments might be concerned about the reliability of supply of goods 
deemed to be of special importance, such as food. Secondly, transactions costs might limit the 
extent to which LDC producers are able to sell their production to the QUAD. For example, 
they would in all likelihood need to expend resources to certify the quality of their goods 
before they are able to penetrate the QUAD market. For these reasons, we limit the empirical 
analysis to a 10% import-export swap.   
 
 
3. Measuring the gains of preferential market access 
 
The methodology 
In order to arrive at empirical estimates of the theoretical measures of the total gains for LDCs 
of duty-free and quota-free access in the QUAD, we need information about: 
• The price responsiveness of demand and supply in the LDCs, import demand in the 
QUAD countries, and export supply in other countries; 
• The quantities produced and consumed in the LDCs; 
• The preference margin for goods exported by the LDCs to the QUAD (measured in 
absolute values). 
Data are scarce in many of these areas, in particular concerning price responsiveness. It has 
therefore not been possible to undertake a comprehensive numerical assessment of the gains 
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and losses for LDCs. Our approach is a pragmatic one, using available data to shed light on 
the potential magnitudes involved. We provide three different types of measures of the 
potential gains of duty-free access. The first two are approximations of our two theoretical 
measures, ∆WI and ∆WII. Neither of these includes a satisfactory estimate of the value added 
from increased production. Unfortunately, no such estimate is readily available. However, 
Hoekman et al. (2001) provide an estimate of the potential increase in export revenue from 
freer market access in the QUAD. As an approximation of the value added from expanding 
production, it has two shortcomings. Firstly, the benefits from higher prices on existing 
exports are included. Secondly, it does not subtract the extra costs generated by the 
production increase. The severity of the second error of course depends on the opportunity 
costs of factors of production. If there are plentiful idle resources, the opportunity cost is zero 
and so the increased revenues from expanding production are equal to the increase in value 
added. Therefore, if we subtract the gains from higher prices on existing exports we may think 
of this measure as an upper bound on the increase in value added from higher output. 
   
Measure I: Approximating ∆WI  
Recall that  
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )( )202000 '
2
1'
2
1
QLLQLLQLLLI tpqstppdtppdqsW +∆++∆−+∆−=∆    
 
We have data on the quantities involved as well as tQL. We lack information about the change 
in the world market price that preferential market access for LDCs would induce and the 
responsiveness of supply and demand in LDCs to price changes. Our approach is therefore to 
estimate ( ) ( )[ ]( )QLLL tpdqs 00 − , which corresponds to the areas C+F+G in figure 1. This might 
be a useful approximation of B+C+D; in any case, it is not possible to state with certainty that 
our measure over- or underestimates the theoretically correct measure. 
To arrive at an estimate of C+F+G, we proceed as follows. First, we derive a measure of the 
potential gains from higher prices on existing exports to QUAD. This is a measure of the pure 
price effect of higher prices on existing exports to the QUAD. It does not take into account 
the benefits of redirecting existing sales in non-QUAD markets. We use data on existing 
customs duties on LDC imports in the QUAD in order to arrive at this measure. The value of 
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existing customs duties is in fact a very good estimate of the short-term gains of duty-free 
access. The reason is that most of the customs duties collected by the QUAD on LDC imports 
are related to the clothing sector. Under the Multifibre Agreement, imports of clothing to the 
USA and Canada are restricted by quotas until 2005. The exporters administer these quotas so 
that the value of the quotas accrues to the exporting countries. Import tariffs in the US and 
Canada reduce the market value of the quotas. By removing the tariffs, the market value of 
quotas would increase by the value of the existing customs duties. Hence, these revenues are 
good indicators of the short-term gains of duty-free access. 
Secondly, we derive an indicator of the gains from redirecting existing exports to markets 
outside the QUAD to the QUAD. Redirecting exports that currently go to other destinations 
will be the easiest way of increasing exports to the QUAD markets in the short run. The 
existence of exports must imply that an export infrastructure has been established in the home 
country. Therefore, redirection of exports only requires that marketing channels are 
established in the QUAD markets (if they are not there already) and that the products satisfy 
consumer preferences and legal standards in the QUAD. Unfortunately, a complete measure 
of the potential gains from rerouting existing exports to the QUAD requires detailed data on 
preferential margins and quantities by product category. In the absence of the requisite 
information, we have calculated the potential benefits of redirecting exports from non-QUAD 
markets to the EU for a selected group of products containing the most important agricultural 
exports of the LDCs. 
The QUAD countries collect about 220 million USD annually in customs duties on their 
imports from LDCs. As shown in figure 2, more than 80% of these duties is collected by the 
USA. Canada also collects a disproportionally high share of the duties. The EU, while 
representing almost 60% of the total QUAD imports, collects less than 4% of the customs 
duties. 
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Figure 2. QUAD customs duties and imports 
from LDCs
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Sources: OECD (1997), Canadian government, European Commission (2000), and own calculations. 
 
The customs duties collected by the QUAD countries on the imports from LDCs amount to 
1.1% of total LDC exports and 0.13% of total GDP in the LDCs (UNCTAD 2000a). Hence, 
the removal of import tariffs will not raise incomes in the LDCs significantly unless there is a 
change in export volumes to the QUAD. 
Removal of tariffs will mean more for some LDCs than for others. In Canada, 92% of the 
customs duties are collected from Asian LDCs and Bangladesh alone accounted for 77%. We 
would expect a similar pattern in the USA as well, because the customs duties in the USA are 
related exclusively to the imports of clothing, and exports of these products from Africa are 
very low. Therefore, if some of the current tariff revenues are transferred to the LDCs, the 
main beneficiary will be Bangladesh. But even for Bangladesh, the values at stake are not 
sufficiently large to make a major difference. If we assume, for the sake of illustration, that 
80% of the reduced tariff income accrues to Bangladesh, this would mean an increase in GDP 
of 0.4%. Although such an increase in income certainly would be welcome, it would not mean 
a big leap forward for this country, which has experienced annual grow rates in real GDP of 
4-5% during the period 1990-98 (UNCTAD 2000a). For a country like Bangladesh, which has 
demonstrated its ability to develop a thriving export industry, the main benefits of reduced 
tariffs will in the long run be more related to the possibilities of expanding production and 
export volumes as competitiveness is improved.  
In sum, the overall benefits that can be reaped by LDCs from higher prices on existing exports 
to the QUAD are quite limited. Would rerouting exports to the QUAD from the rest of the 
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world create sizeable benefits, then? The figures in table 1 suggest that the answer is no. All 
the products included in table 1 face high tariffs in the EU at present. Most of them are highly 
protected in the Japanese market as well, but not in the USA and Canada. As mentioned 
previously, we calculate the potential benefit to the LDCs under the assumption that LDC 
producers capture the whole preferential margin. We approximate the preferential margin in 
the EU by the differential between the prices on the world market and in the EU, shown in 
columns two and three. Multiplying the result with the volume of exports going to 
destinations outside the QUAD (column four times column five) yields a measure of the 
potential gain from switching export sales to the EU by product category, stated in millions of 
USD in the rightmost column. The total across all products is slightly more than a fourth of 
the value of existing custom duties. It is thus clear that adding these gains to the value of 
current customs revenues in the QUAD does not change our previous conclusion that the 
benefits to the LDCs appear to be modest. Of course, the total of about 278 million USD 
annually does not include potential gains from expanding production. These are discussed 
later. First we shall see that import-export swaps offer potentially much greater benefits to the 
LDCs. 
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Table 1: The potential gains from redirecting exports  
 EU price (USD/t) 
World 
price 
(USD/t) 
Non-QUAD 
share of 
LDC 
exports 
Total LDC 
exports 
(1000t) 
Value of 
redirecting 
existing 
exports  
(mill. USD) 
Cereals   
Wheat 123 109 1 124.5 1.7 
Maize 129 85 0.75 183.5 6.1 
Rice 554 277 0.97 110.7 29.7 
Sugar 600 231 0.1 280.1 10.3 
Fruits/vegetables   
Bananas 609 332 0.32 20.6 1.8 
Tomatoes 727 584 0.32 1.6 0.1 
Meat   
Beef 2566 1640 0.18 5.1 0.9 
Poultry 1232 902 0.39 0.1 0.0 
Sheep 3077 1363 0.18 14.0 4.3 
Dairy products   
Butter 2727 1207 1 1.932 2.9 
Cheese 3231 1989 1 0.019 0.0 
Total these products  58.0 
Sources: FAO on production and exports, European Commission (2001a) on prices, and GTAP version 4 on 
export shares to non-QUAD countries. 
 
Measure II: Approximating ∆WII 
With full utilisation of import-export swaps, we know from the theoretical analysis that the 
potential gain for the LDCs corresponds to the areas A+B+C+D+E+F in figure 1. In this case, 
we could approximate the gains by A+B+C+E+F+G. That is, we could take the product of the 
preferential margin and existing sales, which might greater or smaller than the theoretically 
appropriate measure. Once again, though, data limitations preclude us from producing a 
comprehensive estimate. We have to limit ourselves to the products considered in the analysis 
of market switching for existing exports, and use preferential margins for the EU market.   
However, it should be noted that the LDCs will have much greater difficulties diverting sales 
from their domestic markets to the QUAD countries. It appears that such trade swaps are most 
likely for agricultural food products, for which only a few LDCs have established an adequate 
export infrastructure. In addition to building physical infrastructure, the LDCs must create 
mechanisms to ensure compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in the 
 
 
16 
importing countries. They will also have to develop import infrastructure and internal 
distribution networks that can adequately serve domestic consumers. Finally, considerations 
about food supply security may make some countries reluctant to engage in import-export 
swaps in food products on a large scale. We therefore limit our calculations to the effects of a 
10% swap. 
 
Table 2: The potential gains from import-export swaps 
 EU price (USD/t) 
World 
price 
(USD/t) 
LDC 
produc-
tion 
(1000t) 
Value of 10% 
import-export 
swap (mill. USD) 
Cereals   
Wheat 123 109 7217 10.0 
Maize 129 85 16335 72.4 
Rice 554 277 40807 1130.2 
Sugar 600 231 2056 75.9 
Fruits/vegetables   
Bananas 609 332 5694 157.7 
Tomatoes 727 584 1176 16.7 
Meat   
Beef meat 2566 1640 2235 207.2 
Poultry meat 1232 902 886 29.3 
Sheep meat 3077 1363 1159 198.7 
Dairy products   
Butter 2727 1207 109 16.6 
Cheese 3231 1989 197 24.5 
Total these products  1939.1 
Sources: FAO on production and exports, European Commission (2001a) on prices, and GTAP version 4 on 
export shares to non-QUAD countries.    
 
The exercise in table 2 exemplifies the benefits to the LDCs from diverting 10% of their 
existing production (which presently by and large is used to serve domestic needs). We 
emphasise that these numbers are not based on an assessment of the actual export potential. 
That would require detailed analysis at the product and country level. 
These figures should be interpreted with great caution. There is however, a clear tendency 
wherein the potential gains from a 10% import-export swap are significantly greater than the 
potential gains from redirecting existing exports. This is due to the fact that LDC exports of 
these products presently are very low relative to their production levels. The potential gains 
from import-export swaps also seem relatively large compared to the value of higher prices on 
existing exports to the QUAD. In total, our estimate of ∆WII is more than seven times our 
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estimate of ∆WI. 
The potential gains from redirecting exports of textiles and clothing are probably limited, in 
part because the QUAD share of existing exports of clothing is very large and partly because 
consumer preferences differ greatly between markets. The probability of import-export swaps 
is greater for cereals and sugar than for meat and dairy products due to more stringent sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures for the latter categories. Thus, the potential for substantial gains 
from import-export swaps seems to be greatest in such products as sugar and rice. However, 
there are a number of reasons why we may have exaggerated the gains in the rice sector. First, 
Myanmar, which is excluded from preferential treatment both in the EU and the USA for 
political reasons, is the main LDC exporter of rice (90% of the total) and also an important 
producer (25% of the total). Moreover, the EU market for rice is too small to accommodate a 
10% import-export swap; the export increase is almost twice the size of the EU market. If 
large quantities of rice are admitted into the EU market, the price is likely to fall dramatically, 
as will the potential gains for the LDCs. On the other hand, if some of the exports is 
accommodated by the Japanese market, which is four times larger than the EU market and 
where current prices exceeding the world market prices by a factor of five, substantial gains 
could still be attained in this sector.7   
  
Measure III: The value added of increased production 
We have yet to take into account the fact that the removal of tariffs and quotas may increase 
the level of production in the LDCs. This would create additional gains. Note, however, that a 
dollar increase in export revenues generated by increased production has a smaller impact on 
GDP than one extra dollar received on existing exports. The reason is that the gain on existing 
exports is a pure price effect, implying that GDP increases in step with the export revenues, 
while gains arising from a production increase come at a cost, since additional inputs must be 
used in order to increase production. A meaningful comparison between the two requires that 
only the value-added component (i.e., the extra export revenue minus the additional costs of 
inputs) is counted in the case of export revenues generated by increased production. Only if 
the expansion of production is generated by employing resources that are presently idle will 
the increase in export revenues be identical to the increase in valued added. Hence, the extra 
revenues are an upper bound on the value added from increasing production.   
                                                 
7 For other products than rice, LDCs would still have a minor market share in the EU (less than 4% in most 
categories, except bananas (16%) and mutton (8%)). 
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A few studies of the potential increase in LDC export revenue from improved market access 
in the QUAD are available (Ianchovichina et al. (2000), Hoekman et al. (2001), UNCTAD 
(2000b)). The study by Hoekman et al. comes closest to our needs, and we will therefore 
report some of its results.8 Hoekman et al. investigate the consequences of removing all tariff 
peaks (defined as tariffs above 15%) in the QUAD on imports from LDCs. With reference to 
figure 1, the measure provided by Hoekman et al. corresponds to the area C+D+H+I+J, which 
surely may differ considerably from the “ideal” measures of higher value added from 
expanding production, D. In the extreme case where the social opportunity cost of increasing 
export supply is zero, though, the total increase in value added is D+H+I+J. Then we would 
only need to subtract C, the extra revenues on existing exports, in order for the measure of 
Hoekman et al. (2001) to be theoretically correct. 
However, their study also have some other important shortcomings: 1) In cases with tariff-
quotas, they use out-of-quota tariff rates. Since LDCs in many cases enjoy duty-free access 
within quotas (e.g. for several agricultural products in the US and the EU), this will lead to an 
overestimation of the gains. 2) If current exports are zero, the simulated export level will be 
zero when tariffs are reduced as well. This suggests that gains may be underestimated. 3) The 
assumptions about supply capacity in LDCs are arbitrary.9 4) The model does not take into 
account that rules of origin may prevent LDCs from taking advantage of preferential access. 
The latter point is a crucial one, because most of the gains come in the clothing sector, where 
rules of origin are a significant trade barrier for LDCs (see Section 4).   
Hoekman et al. find that if the QUAD countries eliminate all tariff peaks simultaneously, 
LDC export revenue would increase by 11% (i.e., 2.5 billion USD). This is more than ten 
times the current customs duties collected by the QUAD countries on LDC imports. It is also 
higher than our estimates of ∆WI and ∆WII. To obtain an upper bound for the increase in value 
added from an expansion of production, we subtract the gain from higher prices on existing 
exports (area C in figure 1). Above, we estimated the area C+F+G to some 278 million USD. 
Hence, we conclude that if production can be increased in the LDCs without social costs, the 
gains from increasing production in response to preferential treatment in the QUAD may be 
                                                 
8 The main problem with Ianchovichina et al. is that not all LDCs are included, and among the countries which 
are included, there are several non-LDCs. Our main problem with the UNCTAD study is that it does not take 
into account the supply constraints in the LDCs.  
9 A one percent increase in the export price is assumed to generate a 0.5 percent increase in export volumes for 
all products and countries. 
 
 
19 
well above 2 billion USD annually. The assumption of zero costs is however extreme. Most 
likely, therefore, the real gains are considerably smaller.  
 
Source: Hoekman et al. (2001). 
 
The Hoekman et al. study also shows that the gains for LDCs would be much larger if the 
tariff peaks were eliminated in the US and Canada than in Japan and the EU. Indeed, the gains 
from an EU reform are quite modest. Figure 3 demonstrates the impact on LDC export 
revenue of removing tariff peaks in each of the QUAD countries (while trade policies are kept 
constant in the three other regions). 
The potential increase in export revenue is concentrated in a few product categories; apparel, 
sugar and tobacco. In the US and Canada, where the main benefits are to be reaped, the share 
of apparel in the total revenue increase is 66% and 94%, respectively. In the US, another 30% 
of the revenue increase comes in the tobacco sector. In the EU and Japan, most of the increase 
in export revenues comes in the sugar sector, reaping 64% of the revenue increase in the EU 
and 91% in Japan. 
The gains will also be very unevenly distributed across LDCs. Exporters of apparel in Asia 
(e.g. Bangladesh, Laos, and Cambodia) are the main beneficiaries. We believe that the gains 
in the clothing sector may be overestimated because exporters of apparel in Asia, particularly 
Bangladesh, have difficulties in satisfying rules of origin in a number of product categories. 
Figure 3. Increase in LDC export revenue with unilateral 
liberalisation (mill. USD)
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On the other hand, the gains for certain agricultural products may be underestimated because 
current exports are low or absent due to existing trade barriers. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Our results indicate that the potential gains for the LDCs of free market access are quite 
modest. In this section we seek to explain why this is so. We firstly point out that LDCs 
already enjoy quite liberal market access in the QUAD. Secondly, we argue that the export 
supply of these countries for a variety of reasons is likely to be fairly price inelastic in the 
short to medium run. Thirdly, we discuss how restrictive rules of origin in the preference 
schemes of the importing countries are likely to prevent some of the LDCs which potentially 
have the most to gain, the Asian producers of clothing, from realising the full benefits of 
improved market access. Finally, we point out that due to policy responses in importing 
countries, an LDC success in utilising preferential access may erode the preference margins 
over time. 
 
Relatively low trade barriers towards LDCs at present 
All QUAD countries presently provide preferential market access for LDCs under their 
respective Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).  Moreover, all LDCs but the Asian ones, 
benefit from the Cotonou Agreement with the EU, and Sub-Saharan LDCs benefit from 
special arrangements in the USA under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This means 
that duty-free and quota-free access typically will be of less value for the LDCs than for other 
developing countries. 
The scope and depth of the preferential trade agreements vary greatly among the QUAD 
countries. The broad pattern is as follows: 
The EU market has been quite open for the LDCs for a long time. All industrial products have 
been liberalised, along with a number of agricultural products. However, there have been 
import restrictions on products that come under the Common Agricultural Policy, notably for 
rice, sugar, bananas, maize, meat, and dairy products. After the recent approval of the 
(revised) “everything-but-arms” initiative, only rice, sugar, and bananas are not fully 
liberalised.       
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The USA has a restrictive import policy for textiles and clothing. But most agricultural 
products that have been restricted in the EU have enjoyed duty-free access in the US. 
However, there are import quotas for meat, dairy products, peanuts, sugar, and tobacco.  
Japan has a quite liberal trade policy towards LDCs in the industrial sector. There are 
restrictions on imports of leather products and a tax on petroleum. Textile imports from LDCs 
are subject to constraints as well, although these barriers will be removed shortly. The 
agricultural sector in Japan is heavily protected, and only a few product categories are granted 
duty-free and quota-free access. 
Canada’s import regime is similar to the American one, but it is considerably more restrictive. 
There are tariffs and tariff quotas on a number of agricultural products (e.g. dairy products, 
poultry, eggs, margarine, wheat, barley, beef, and a number of vegetables). Out-of-quota 
tariffs are extremely high for meat and dairy products. Although most industrial products are 
liberalised, there are severe import barriers on products that are of great importance for LDCs, 
such as textiles, clothing, and footwear.  
We draw the following conclusions: for industrial products, LDCs do not face duties or 
import quotas in the QUAD in sectors other than textiles, clothing, and footwear. Moreover, 
most non-Asian LDCs have enjoyed free market access for these products in the EU for 
decades without being able to take advantage of it. Hence, there is no reason to believe that 
duty-free access in the American markets will make a big difference for these countries. 
Therefore, the main beneficiaries of free market access in these products are likely to be the 
Asian LDCs.   
Similarly, most agricultural products from LDCs that currently face import restrictions in one 
of the QUAD countries, enjoy free market access in one or more of the other countries. The 
inability of LDC exports to penetrate QUAD markets even in the absence of restrictions is a 
strong indication of lack of competitiveness. Admittedly, preferential access to markets that 
presently are protected might induce some exports due to higher prices in these markets than 
on the world market. But to stake a lot on products in which one is not competitive on the 
world market is risky business; unless the LDCs are able to become competitive through 
“learning by doing” type effects, it is unlikely that the LDCs will be able to obtain long-term 
gains by expanding their exports in such commodities.  
Inelastic Supply 
In the long run, increasing the production of export commodities is probably the most 
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important potential source of benefits from preferential trade liberalisation. The size of the 
gains depends on the price elasticity of supply, which will vary across products and countries. 
Within the confines of this article, it is not possible to be specific with respect to products and 
countries. Instead, we look at the aggregate supply capacity of “the average LDC”. The 
conclusion is that export supply in LDCs is likely to be fairly inelastic in the short to medium 
term.10 
First of all, note that if there is to be a change in export patterns or supply, the benefits of 
increased prices in the QUAD must obviously be passed on to producers. That is, LDC 
governments must refrain from taxing away all gains.11 If they do, it is likely that there are 
unemployed or underutilised resources in the LDCs. However, while this might allow them to 
increase export supply rapidly at a fairly low cost, it is clearly the case that the average 
worker in LDCs is significantly less productive than his counterparts elsewhere. This holds 
both in the aggregate and with respect to the important agricultural sector. For example, based 
on data from World Bank (2000), we have calculated that over 1995-98 labour productivity in 
LDCs was only 61% of the productivity level in the entire group low-income countries. The 
data in Hall and Jones (1999), who measure labour productivity relative to the US for 126 
other countries in 1988, indicates that the low level of productivity in LDCs is attributable to 
low levels of fixed and human capital, as well as to low levels of total factor productivity 
(TFP).12 The major cause of the productivity gap was the latter. In this sense, the supply 
capacity of LDCs seems limited, since it will take either large amounts of inputs or sizeable 
increases in TFP to produce extra output.  
According to the best available cross-country data on educational achievement (Barro and Lee 
2000), in 1995 the average adult in an LDC had only 2.37 years of schooling. Equally as bad 
is the fact that over half of the population in LDCs aged fifteen years or above had no 
schooling. Since it takes time to accumulate educational capital, rapid increases in education 
levels are not to be expected. Thus, in the near future levels of human capital will continue to 
be low when measured by this indicator. The situation is unfortunately not much better with 
                                                 
10 The arguments that lead to this conclusion are spelled out in more detail in appendix 3 of Hagen, Mæstad, and 
Wiig (2001).  
11 The benefits can be taxed away directly or indirectly through the operations of state trading enterprises (STEs). 
STEs are major actors in many markets for agricultural goods in LDCs, but unfortunately not much is known 
about the nature of their operations (c.f. Ingco and Ng 1998). 
12 Production per worker in LDCs was on average only about 4.5% of the US level. Note that there are two 
outliers among the LDCs, Yemen and Bangladesh, which at relative levels of production per worker of 21.2% 
and 12.7%, respectively, are head and shoulders above the rest of the group. If they are excluded, the average 
drops to 4.1%.  
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respect to health. There is certainly an enormous need for expanding and upgrading health and 
education systems in LDCs. In light of these observations, it is doubtful whether the current 
spending levels will make much difference. This conclusion is strengthened if we take into 
account the fact that several studies show that public spending in developing countries has 
little effect, if any, on outcomes in the social sectors (e.g., infant mortality).13 
Rates of net domestic fixed investment in LDCs are comparable to those of both low-income 
and middle-income countries. However, one should bear in mind that the efficiency of the 
investment might be low. The astonishing conclusion of Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2000) 
- that in Africa, where most of the LDCs are located, neither private nor public investment is 
productive – indicates that this problem is for real. Moreover, public infrastructure of vital 
importance to the export sectors is in a sorry state. For example, in 1988 25% of the main 
paved roads and 51% of the main unpaved roads were in poor condition.14 As most LDCs are 
located far from the QUAD markets and sixteen of them are further hampered by being 
landlocked15, it seems reasonable to conclude that higher prices due to increased market 
access will not lead to a significant supply response in the short to medium term.  
In the 1990s, the average rate of net domestic savings was negative in LDCs, implying that 
they did not manage to reduce their rate of indebtedness during this period and that sustaining 
the investment effort depends on financial flows from abroad. High levels of debt are 
currently a major problem for the LDCs. More than half of them (twenty-six) are classified as 
heavily indebted by the World Bank. In present value terms, they owed almost 90% of their 
GNP in 1998. Although the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative holds the 
promise of reducing the debt to manageable levels for many LDCs, they would still have to 
adjust in order to qualify for debt relief.16 This means that the timing and magnitude of any 
reduction are uncertain. Moreover, what is not forgiven must be repaid at some point in time. 
Hence, there is uncertainty about future tax rates. This might deter investment in physical 
capital, which is often irreversible, making investors reluctant to commit themselves in the 
face of uncertainty about future returns, of which taxes are one important determinant. 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (1997), Filmer and Pritchett (1999), and Gupta, Verhoeven and 
Tiongson (1999), as well as the references cited therein. This might be due to corruption or mismanagement, or 
simply reflect an inoptimal composition of spending. 
14 The scale of this problem in the year in question in countries like Guinea (50% and 100%, respectively), 
Guinea-Bissau (35% and 88%) and Chad (90% and 100%) is simply mind-boggling. These numbers are taken 
from the largest database on infrastructure indicators assembled so far (see Canning 1998). 
15 Limao and Venables (1999), for instance, find that the median landlocked country in their sample had 
transport costs which were 58% higher than the median coastal country.  
16 At the end of 2000, thirty of the forty-one HIPCs were LDCs. 
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Macroeconomic policy uncertainty and volatility, which have repeatedly been shown to be 
detrimental to investment and growth, is strongly present in LDCs. The situation is most 
problematic with respect to exchange rates. A third of the countries for which there is data had 
black market premiums exceeding 20% on average in 1996-98, which must be considered 
high. Exchange rate overvaluation penalises the export sectors by reducing their revenues 
measured in terms of the national currency. Thus, if sustained over time, such policies 
discourage investment in these sectors. Furthermore, the real effective exchange rate is 
extremely volatile in some countries. This makes it difficult for exporters to predict their 
returns, and negatively affects their willingness to invest.17 It is therefore doubtful whether 
higher prices in the QUAD, which, when viewed in isolation, obviously will strengthen 
investment incentives, are sufficient to create a positive investment response in the export 
sectors.18 
Foreign aid is the only really important source of external financing for LDCs. In the 1990s 
aid flows have been several orders of magnitude larger than inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and FDI is the second most important source of foreign funds for LDCs. 
There are of course many reasons for the extreme dependency of LDCs on foreign aid. They 
are not creditworthy in private international capital markets. Their financial markets are 
underdeveloped. Thus, neither private bank lending nor portfolio flows are important to these 
countries. Although there has been some improvement during the 1990s, FDI bypasses LDCs 
to a large extent. Given that foreign aid flows have declined sharply in the latter half of the 
1990s and cannot be expected to make a major recovery in the near term, it is doubtful 
whether the levels of investment necessary to support a major export drive can be generated. 
 
Restrictive rules of origin  
As was pointed out in Section 3, rules of origin (ROO) may severely limit the benefits that 
LDCs can reap from duty-and quota-free access. Importing countries may use ROO as a trade 
barrier by making the rules unduly complex or restrictive. The LDCs claim that the 
industrialised countries are already doing this by employing regulations that are unreasonably 
restrictive and by not harmonising the rules across product groups and across countries. When 
Hoekman et al. (2001) showed that most of the potential gains from duty-free access accrue in 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Elbadawi (1998) for an empirical analysis which documents the importance for non-traditional 
exports from developing countries of keeping the real exchange rate stable at its equilibrium level.  
18 This conclusion is supported by the fact that other sources of investment risk, such as volatility of the terms of 
trade and political risk, are also highly significant in LDCs. 
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the clothing sector, they did not take into account that a considerable share of this potential 
cannot be realised under the present ROO. 
Harmonisation of ROO in the GSP systems would reduce the information requirements and 
therefore the costs of utilising the GSP system. A reduction in costs would probably increase 
the utilisation rates (see below). The importance of harmonisation is further underscored by 
the lack of harmonisation between non-preferential ROO and preferential ROO and the fact 
that a country may face different sets of regulations in different preferential arrangements.  
ROO are not a problem for the majority of LDCs since their exports are restricted to 
agricultural products and raw materials. These products are generally wholly produced within 
one country. Though, problems arise with respect to industrialised products, in particular 
textiles and clothing. Several Asian LDCs have a considerable capacity to produce apparel if 
they are allowed to freely import the intermediates. Their ability to do so is, however, limited 
by the ROO in the QUAD. 
 
Table 3: Utilisation rate of GSP preferences in the QUAD, 1997 
 LDCs All beneficiaries 
 Imports GSP 
covered (1000 
USD) 
Imports GSP 
received (1000 
USD) 
Utilisation rate (%) Utilisation rate 
(%) 
Canada 8 537 4 656 54.5 65.9 
EU 2 888 780 770 768 26.7 55.9 
Japan 313 753 228 913 73.0 42.5 
USA 2 719 570 790 655 29.1 61.1 
Source: UNCTAD (1999b).  
 
By comparing the imports that would be eligible for GSP treatment if formal requirements 
were fulfilled with the imports that actually receive preferences, we get an indication of the 
significance of ROO. As shown in table 3, a substantial share of the imports that are covered 
by GSP does not receive preferential treatment. One possible explanation is that the 
preferential margins may be too low to warrant the efforts needed in order to receive GSP 
treatment.  A low utilisation rate for Angola in the US might for instance be explained by the 
fact that the preference margin on oil imports is only a few cents per barrel. 
However, being unable to satisfy ROO is also a major reason why preferential treatment is not 
received. Looking at disaggregated data for the EU one observes that some Asian countries 
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that typically have large exports of textiles and clothing have very low utilisation rates even 
though preferential margins are significant. For instance, only 27% of the imports from 
Bangladesh to the EU, most of which is apparel, are granted preferential access. The 
explanation is that Bangladesh is not able to satisfy ROO in the EU for apparel based on 
woven fabrics (although they qualify for knitted products). Bangladesh has to rely on 
imported fabrics (only 15% of woven fabrics are produced domestically, as compared to 60% 
of knitted fabrics). Without building up a domestic textile industry, Bangladesh is likely to 
face similar problems in the US and Canada if textiles or clothing products receive larger 
preferences in these markets. In this case, more liberal ROO would be far more important than 
simply a harmonisation.  
It is noteworthy that the utilisation rate for LCD beneficiaries in the EU, the US, and Canada 
is lower than the utilisation rate for all beneficiaries, even though LDCs typically receive a 
higher preference margin. This indicates that the question of ROO is more important for 
LDC's than for other developing countries. 
The general rule when inputs are imported is that products must undergo a substantial 
transformation in order to confer origin. Two different principles or tests are currently applied 
to define a substantial transformation. The EU rules are based on a change of tariff heading (at 
the four digit level). The change in heading is referred to as a tariff jump. When the change-
of-tariff-heading approach is used, LDCs will benefit if the required number of tariff jumps is 
small. In the EU and Japan, textiles and clothing must satisfy a “double jump” in order to 
confer origin. LDCs such as Bangladesh, which do not produce woven fabrics domestically, 
are unable to fulfil this requirement. If only a single jump was required, the potential gain for 
LDCs of duty-free and quota-free access would be substantially enhanced. The alternative 
principle is a percentage criterion, either a maximum percentage of imported intermediates or 
a minimum percentage of domestic content (typically more than 35%). If the percentage 
criterion is used, LDCs need the requirements for domestic content or value added to be 
below 20-25% in order to take full advantage of preferential market access in the clothing 
sector. For instance, the value added (as a share of product price) of a typical product in 
Bangladesh, say a woven pair of trousers, produced on the basis of imported fabrics is 27% 
(Rahman and Bhattacharya 2000). The percentage increases when grey fabrics are imported 
or when accessories are produced domestically, but only when production is based on 
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imported yarn, the value added exceeds 50%.19 Without reducing the required number of tariff 
jumps or percentage domestic content, it is unlikely that LDCs will achieve the level of gains 
as suggested by Hoekman et al. (2001). 
 
Market and policy responses in importing countries 
As mentioned in section 3, all of our empirical measures of the gains to LDCs from greater 
market access in the QUAD are based on the assumption that there is no market power in the 
importing countries, whether at the retail or the wholesale level. This is probably unrealistic. 
We know that multinational companies (MNCs) are major operators in international markets 
for agricultural commodities, and the five largest supermarket chains have a market share of 
more than 50% in most European countries (UNCTAD 1999a). Unfortunately, a lack of data 
prevents us from estimating the extent to which the gains from improved market access might 
be captured by market actors outside LDCs.20 
However, even if the leakage of benefits through these channels are small, gains for LDCs 
might be limited by policy changes in the importing countries. Hoekman et.al (2001) show 
that the benefits to LDCs from the elimination of tariff peaks will be smaller with multilateral 
trade liberalisation. That is, for these countries, it is essential that preferences are maintained. 
There is no guarantee, though, that their competitive position will not be eroded during future 
rounds in the WTO.  
Moreover, LDC success in utilising preferential access may undermine the preference 
margins. The rationale for maintaining high import protection against non-LDCs in importing 
countries might disappear if LDCs capture large market shares from domestic producers. 
Likewise, other policies which sustain high price margins in the QUAD could lose political 
support in such an event. The purpose of redirecting existing sales is to take advantage of high 
domestic prices in protected QUAD markets relative to the world market. Therefore, 
beneficial trade swaps are not likely to be sustainable in the long run unless imports from the 
LDCs continue to be of marginal importance in the QUAD. 
 
 
                                                 
19 This implies that clothing exporters in Bangladesh will not be able to take advantage of the rules on regional 
cumulation in the Everything-But-Arms regulation in the EU. Under the cumulation rule, more than 50% of the 
product value must stem from domestic sources.    
20 The same problem applies to the analysis of the extent to which export producers in the LDCs are owned by 
foreigners. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have discussed potential gains to the LDCs from improved market access in 
the QUAD. In principle, the economic benefits of extending the LDC trade preferences can be 
divided into three components: (1) the value of higher prices on existing production and 
exports; (2) the value-added from expanding production; and (3) the benefits created for (or 
diverted from) consumers in LDCs. Based on measures of the gains that approximate the 
theoretical measures, we conclude that the aggregate benefits of duty-free and quota-free 
access for the LDCs are likely to be modest, even compared to their present low levels of 
income. The main reasons are (1) that most LDCs presently enjoy quite liberal market access 
in important export markets, and (2) that the ability of LDCs to take advantage of trade 
preferences is limited, due to constraints on supply capacity and restrictive requirements for 
rules of origin. Moreover, their gains could be eroded either by further multilateral tariff 
liberalisation in the context of the WTO or by unilateral policy changes in the QUAD in the 
event that LDC exporters capture significant market shares from domestic producers. 
Of course, our empirical measures suffer from several shortcomings. The most critical one is 
perhaps the lack of an explicit link between higher export prices and future supply capacities 
in the LDCs. Access to export markets is without doubt an important factor for stimulating the 
long term growth of the LDCs. On the other hand, as long as market access is granted on a 
preferential basis, there is always uncertainty about the future value of the preferences, since 
the general level of trade barriers may be reduced through multilateral negotiations. This 
uncertainty may reduce the willingness to invest in new capacity. In addition, producers in 
LDCs face a host of other risks that may very well swamp the benefits from improved market 
access. Their debt-burdened governments might not be able to commit to passing the gains on 
to producers, and even if they do, it is unlikely that they will be able to provide the 
infrastructure necessary for a major export drive. This holds not only with respect to transport 
and communication infrastructure, but also to the institutions necessary to provide exporters 
with market information and help with satisfying packaging, labelling, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards in importing countries. Here donors might make a contribution by 
aiding the LDC governments that are making an effort at supporting their exporters. Whether 
such beneficial partnerships will be established remains to be seen. Even if they are, we are 
unfortunately doubtful that this will radically alter our conclusions over the short to medium 
term. The burden of the past as manifested in low levels of labour productivity, inadequate 
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infrastructure, and high levels of fertility is not shed overnight; nor is a Rome of economic 
and political stability built in a day. 
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